In my second post, I explained why I started my blog. I have decided to do an updated post because there are other things I’ve thought about that I would like visitors to this blog and to my Twitter homepage to know. However, I am going to keep the old post up, which you can view here, though most stuff there will be repeated in this post.
“Ugh, stuck!”, Barbara shouted in frustration as the wheels of the car just turned while she pumped the accelerator with her high heels.
“You’re pumping the gas with pumps!”, Jerome remarked with a smirk.
Barbara glared at him and replied, “You’re not helping!”
“I can’t help it; I work in languages!”
“Well, make yourself useful and push this car! We have deliver the documents you translated!”
“Barbara, we could just walk; it’s just over there”, Jerome said, pointing to the town.
“But, Jerome, we have another delivery hours away, and there could be dire consequences!”
Jerome got out and pushed the car. As he tried to get in, Barbara accelerated, dragging him along a few meters. Finally, she stopped and let him in. As he was buckling his seat belt, she showed him his picture and said, “I’m gonna put this where it belongs!”
She then taped it to the accelerator and floored it. She then slammed on the brakes.
“What was that for!?”, Jerome shrieked.
“That was for focusing on my shoes instead of getting unstuck! And don’t give me that sexist nonsense stereotyping women as shoe crazy!”
In chapter one (“Approaches: Understanding Intercultural Communication”) of Intercultural Communication: A Reader, Larry Samovar gives an explanation of culture (pp. 12-15). In this, he describes the function of culture, which is to help us find our bearings in the world (p. 12); a definition of culture, namely “the deposit of knowledge, experience, beliefs, values, attitudes, meanings, hierarchies, religion, notions of time, roles, spatial relations, concepts of the universe, and material objects and possessions acquired by a group of people in the course of generations through individual and group striving” (pp. 12-13); the ingredients of culture, which are artifacts (physical objects), concepts (beliefs and value systems), and behaviors (actual practice of beliefs and concepts, Almaney and Alwan, qte in Samovar, p. 13); and the characteristics of culture, that culture is learned, transmissible, dynamic, selective, interrelated, and ethnocentric (pp. 13-15, to be explained more and discussed below).
I think it is best to start with the characteristics of culture and tie them to the other aspects. Samovar, in mentioning that culture is learned, says that people learn culture by growing up in it and learn the culture in which they grow up, a process called enculturation (p. 13). Samovar says this happens through “interaction, observation, and imitation” that produces competence in a particular culture (ibid). That causes me to wonder if we are all brainwashed by the cultures in we were raised in. I will come back to this when I discuss the selectiveness of culture.
Concerning transmissibility, Samovar mentions that “the symbols of a culture enable us to pass on the content patterns of a culture”, and lists “the mind, books, pictures, films, videos, and the like” as means by which we pass on such content (p. 13). This makes me wonder to what degree can we get an understanding of another culture through their literature and media, even through things that violate a society’s norms or is in some other way controversial. I can see a potential problem in that historical literature may represent values that have changed (tied to the idea of culture’s being dynamic), or that some media may be controversial and defy societal norms. (An example in US society is The Howard Stern Show, which violated a number of taboos of US society.)
Another aspect of this is national flags as symbols, which Samovar mentions (p. 13). This ties to the aforementioned idea of artifacts, concepts, and behaviors. The flag is a symbol of a nation (ibid), and is an artifact. A US flag’s symbolizing USA and freedom is a concept, and norms regarding its use reflect behaviors (such as flag etiquette, the pledge of allegiance, saluting the flag, etc). Even violation of such norms (such as flag burning) is tied to concepts, in that the offensiveness of such behaviors is tied to the concepts that the artifacts symbolize, and is sometimes tied to protests (which is tied to a culture’s being dynamic). Thus, would this render wrong a smart aleck who insists the flag is “just a piece of cloth” and that those offended by desecration need to quit bellyaching and that flag desecration is “no big deal”?
Samovar also discusses culture as dynamic, meaning it changes. He lists three sources of change: invention (something new), diffusion (something imported), and cultural calamity (events which affect culture, p. 14). Samovar notes that the deeper level of values tends to be more resistant to change than the surface level (ibid). With invention, one thing I can think of is Islam in the Arabian peninsula, whereas paganism had previously been the dominant religion. In addition, Islam brought a change of values to the society, though many customs persisted to this day. However, many Muslims believe some of these surviving values are out of line with Islamic values. Could a reason these values survived be because they are deeper-level values, and thus more resistant to change.
An example of diffusion I can think of is Europe’s adoption of Christianity starting in the fourth century. Previously, Europe was pagan. However, even here, many values from pre-Christian Europe survived, and have influenced USA. Many Christians feel these values are not in line with the teachings of Jesus, similar to the situations Muslims face with pre-Islamic values. Another example of diffusion was how Thoreau (an American thinker) was influenced by Eastern thinkers, and how Thoreau later influenced Gandhi, who later influenced MLK, who influenced the Dalai Lama. The influences go back and forth between East and West.
When Samovar mentions how deeper level values resist change, I thought of how activists who want to change a society’s values tend to appeal to other values. An example of this is how anti-racist activists in USA appeal to USA’s mythology of being a place of opportunity for everyone, particularly quoting the Declaration of Independence, which says “all men are created equal, and are endowed by their Creator with…life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”. An example of this type of protest goes back to artifacts, concepts, and behaviors, and my previous comment that even behavior defying social norms reflects the concepts. Consider #TakeAKnee, in which people kneel during the National Anthem. The National Anthem is an artifact, and its use as a sign of respect for USA is a concept, and standing is a behavior expressing support for that concept. Kneeling violates those norms and is done to protest USA’s valuing whites over POC. This is an attempt to raise awareness for his cause.
Another aspect of culture is that it is selective. Samovar describes this as a culture’s representing “a limited choice of behavior patterns from the infinite patterns of human experience” based on “the basic assumptions and values that are meaningful to each culture“, and that we thus know only an abstraction of what there is to know (p. 14). This brings me back to the question as to whether or not we’re brainwashed by our cultures. If we only have limited knowledge based on what we’re exposed to through our culture, could that constitute brainwashing? I have previously referred to Plato’s Cave, and it is the source of my avatar. I found it meaningful as I expanded myself beyond fundamentalism and the cult I grew up in. I thought the church I grew up in was like Plato’s Cave, and wondered to what degree the ideas those around me were so adamant about were mere shadows on the wall they perceived as realities. I also wonder that about growing up in USA: is that a Cave? Also, sometimes conservatives accuse liberals of living in a bubble. The question is being only aware of USA and not of other cultures is living in a bubble. I also wonder to what degree the Texas Sharpshooter Fallacy is at play here. This fallacy refers to the idea of a cowboy’s shooting at a barn, and then drawing a bullseye where there is a large cluster of bullets to give the impression he’s a good shot. Thus, the fallacy is to focus on certain things and ignore the larger picture. I wonder how much our cultures do that.
That brings us to another question: can intercultural competence be good for personal development? After all, if our cultures limit our experiences, could exposure to another culture and an open mind provide something that would be a good match for someone, but they were unable to explore it because it was outside the framework their first culture provided? Also, considering that a healthy self-love and a healthy others-love are interrelated, to what degree could these discoveries benefit humanity? I also wonder how such cultural boundaries on experience influence our interpretation of holy books like the Bible, Qur’an, Bhagavad-Gita, etc., considering they all came into being in a certain culture that no longer exists, as the culture of the region in which the events of the books occurred has changed over the centuries. To what degree can intercultural competence help a religious person to understand their holy books, and how much misunderstanding comes from a lack of intercultural competence?
Samovar quotes Hall in his description of the interrelatedness of culture, “You touch a culture in one place and everything else is affected” (qte, Samovar, p. 14). One example I can think of is Marvin Harris’s book Why Nothing Works (1986, originally published in 1981 as America Now), in which he ties the changes that had occurred in US society over the previous 40 years to the post-WWII decline of small businesses and rise of conglomerates. Harris believed that societal changes started at the economic level, led to governmental changes, and finally affected social values.
Finally, Samovar describes culture as ethnocentric, which represents the tendency to center itself, to see itself as “right” and to look down on other cultures. This makes me think of the confirmation bias, which refers to the tendency to only pay attention to info that confirms one’s preconceived notions. I see this in how cultures emphasize their most desirable attributes and others’ least desirable ones (the latter can often be exaggerated and in the case of the former, the ethnocentrist will ignore their own vices or even not be aware of them). One way to combat this is to deliberately seek out disconfirming evidence. Thus, I can see seeking alternative perspectives, including critiques of one’s own culture, as a way of combating ethnocentrism.
This last point affects my own view and causes me to question my own values. I wonder how many judgments made on whether or not someone is an asshole, for example, are based on culturally-specific values, and wonder if they can still be meaningful if they are culturally-specific. I wonder if making judgments based on culturally-specific values is ethnocentric and implies that the specific culture’s values are better. I wonder on what basis are these values considered better that goes beyond cultural biases. Also, if one is to act a certain way due to being present in a particular culture, does that mean that we should just conform to those around us? Isn’t geography an arbitrary measure of morality?
I also wonder if intercultural competence can help one see the shortcomings of their own culture, and can help change things for the better. Extreme relativism (uncritically accepting any practice in the name of “culture”) is undesirable, due to reasons such as human rights. (The strongest case against culture exemptions is that, during the US Civil Rights Movement, segregationists in the American South defended racial segregation as their “way of life”, and that was rejected, because black people’s human rights matter more. This shows how cultural values can be resistant to change in that the battle is still being fought 50 years later.) It is also noteworthy that activism for change exists across cultures, and that the right to agitate for change should not be limited to Westerners, which is what a cultural exemption would imply. However, one thing I think intercultural competence can accomplish is to increase one’s awareness of one’s own culture and the shortcomings of that culture. I noted that folks tend to notice the shortcomings of other cultures more readily than those of their own, and only notice the best of their own cultures. Intercultural competence helps one see other cultures as complex as one’s own, and thus be able to have distance in order to critique.
In sum, I gave Samovar’s characteristics of culture and discussed them.
In this section, Traugott talks about the following aspects of language: symbols, systems, universals, creativity and ambiguity. In this posts, I will summarize her points and give my own thoughts.
Traugott describes language as symbolic and lists three types of symbols, or “entities which represent or stand for other entities” (p. 4): icons, in which the resemblance of the symbol and what it represents is physical; indexal, in which the representation is chronological; and conventional, in which the resemblance has to be learned through a culture. Traugott lists language as conventional and notes that even onomatopoeia is partly conventional (even though it imitates sounds), as the specific representations vary across languages. She also notes how the connection between language and what it represents is arbitrary, and how in place of “fork”, one can say “tenedor“, which is the Spanish word (ibid).
Traugott goes on to describe language as a system, noting that languages are comprised of grammar rules, and gives examples of how grammar varies across languages, and continues this discussion in noting that, despite these differences, there are some grammar universals (such as no language distinguishes formal and informal in only the first and third persons, and no language has an object-verb-subject syntax [p. 8]). She also talks about the capacity to produce an infinite number of sentences and the ability to not be clear. The latter refers to the fact that some sentences can be unclear when taken out of context or that some things can be unambiguous but vague.
I have noted what Traugott notices on the arbitrariness of language and how symbols vary across cultures, even with onomatopoeia. Some examples I know that she does not mention are how a dog’s bark in Spanish is not “bow-wow”, but “guau-guau”, and how a rooster’s crow in Dutch is “kukeleku” instead of “cockadoodledoo”. Even hand gestures vary in meaning across cultures: a thumbs up signal is vulgar in some countries, for example. Also tied to arbitrariness, as well as creativity, is the ability to produce languages. Traugott mentions the ability to talk about things not true as a feature of human language and conventional symbolism (p. 5). This is reflected in how Tolkein can make up languages for Lord of the Rings or how Esperanto was able to be developed, and now can express anything a natural language can. (I was read [I don’t remember where] that a professor once claimed one couldn’t make love in Esperanto, and a student said one can, and she had.) Another example of this is code, in which symbols are developed for secret communication that third parties won’t understand unless they crack the code. Furthermore, this is expressed in nicknames, and even how I have, in some circles of friends, turned friends’ nicknames into verbs, to describe actions I associated with them. Another example of arbitrariness is false friends, which refers to words that sound similar or are spelled similarly in two languages, but mean different things. In some cases, the word is vulgar in one language but not the other, or could mean something normal in one but be a slur in the other. (For example, he Dutch work for “Look!” resembles an English language anti-Semitic slur.)
Concerning systems, some examples I noted not noted by Traugott are how Turkish just adds suffixes, not prefixes or prepositions. Also in Turkish, vowels in suffixes must harmonize (based on the tongue’s position on the mouth) with the last vowel of the main word. Also, Turkish and Farsi have a subject-object-verb structure, and lack gendered pronouns, as does Azeri. In Farsi, the singular they is a more formal form, while the pronoun that means “he, she, it” is more familiar. In English, the singular “they” is used to be unclear about gender, or to be gender-inclusive, which also includes those whose gender is non-binary. (However, the use of the singular “they” is controversial in English.) In Arabic, the general word order is verb-subject-object, which other languages use to indicate questions. (In Arabic, there is a particle at the start if the sentence that indicates questions.)
Concerning ambiguity, one aspect I note is puns, and how the ambiguity is part of the point, as both meanings are intended. Another example includes double entendre, in which a risqué meaning and a clean meaning are possible, and this is often used as a code or to give plausible deniability. This is tied to creativity, how ambiguity can be used creatively, or even how puns and ambiguity can be used cross-linguistically.
Overall, I find beauty in our ability as a species to use language, as we use language even in our private thoughts. I find it interesting we can recognize another language as language even if we don’t speak it, and love how after some time learning the words and, for languages with different writing systems, learning the equivalents of the characters, our brains start processing the stuff in the other language, and how we can even tell people in our native languages what we encountered. (I have noted that written skills are easier than oral ones, and that listening is easier than speaking.)
In this section, Illes discusses ethnography, which is defined as “the study of people in naturally occurring settings or fields by methods which capture their social meanings and ordinary activities, involving a researcher participating directly in the setting, if not also the activities, in order to collect data in a systematic manner but without meaning being imposed on them externally” (Brewer, qte in Illes, p. 139). Illes then goes on to describe aspects of ethnography, such as seeking an insider’s (emic) perspective. (However, some researchers recommend a combination of emic and etic [outsider] perspectives [ibid].) Illes mentions that ethnography seeks to study people social life in natural settings (thus adopting a naturalistic approach; p. 140) and then proceeds to list the steps of ethnographic research and points of consideration. She warns that a bias against the group being studied will hinder research and thus a researcher should study groups they are interested in (p. 142).
For me, this raises many questions. Could an ordinary expat and/or immigrant be an ethnographer? Could travel bloggers be ethnographers? Illes said that researchers, upon leaving the setting of their research, should take notes before they talk to everyone and synthesize their notes towards the end of their field work (p. 141). Does blogging violate those principles? From my viewpoint, there is a possibility commenters could help the researcher transcend biases.
Speaking of blogging, is ethnography possible in social media communities? After all, the only difference with social media is the medium and the fact that crossing borders is (theoretically) easier. Communities form on social media, and these are as real for the participants as are those in meatspace. (Sometimes it is even exciting for folks who first met on social media to meet IRL.)
The article takes about insider and outsider views. Is it possible to gain an outsider view of one’s own culture, and if so, how? I think such would be beneficial on a number of levels, including both personal development (such as finding options for life one was unaware even existed) and social well-being (such as finding better ways of promoting human rights). A couple of attempts are the Nacirema study and Marvin Harris’s 1987 book Why Nothing Works (originally published in 1981 as America Now). How would those decades old studies look in 2019? I do think that an etic view is possible. I know that many raised Evangelical Christian have left their upbringing and formed a community around being former Evangelicals (called #Exvangelical). Having left, they can have an etic view of their former subculture as well as an emic view. This enables them, and everyone, to be able to see the shortcomings of the Evangelical subculture. This shows that achieving an outsider view is, in fact, possible. (Also, does this having both an insider and an outsider view of a subculture within a macroculture help the entire macroculture, and perhaps even reveal some of the biases of the macroculture? Would exposure to cultures outside the macroculture enhance this?)
In sum, I summarized Illes’s article and then just asked a bunch of questions. I realize this is unconventional for a blog, but I think perhaps there should be more questions: they help us think and I acknowledge I don’t know everything. Questions also express the value of uncertainty. My questions involved armchair ethnography and gaining an outside view of one’s own societies.
*The article discussed comes from Guilerme, Manvela,;The Intercultural Dynamics of Multicultural Working; 2010; Multilingualism Matters
In this section, Salzmann talks about the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis, which states that one’s language determines how one thinks to the degree that we are at the mercy of the languages we speak (p. 52). Salzmann lists the support Whorf in particular used to support this hypothesis: the more reckless behavior around empty gasoline drums (qte p. 53) and comparisons with the Hopi language (pp. 54-55). Two ideas that Whorf describes are linguistic determinism, meaning that “the way one thinks is determined by the language one speaks”; and linguistic relativity, meaning “differences in languages must therefore be reflected in the worldview of their speakers” (p. 54).
This raises questions for language learning. This hypothesis reminds me of claims that learning other languages is learning other ways of thinking. In addition, it has me thinking of the claim by some Muslims that the Qur’an can only be read in the original Arabic, and that the most a translation can be is a commentary. Does the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis explain why this would be the case. This also raises the question of other religious texts, such as the Bible (written in Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek), Hindu texts (written in Sanskrit), and Buddhist texts (written in Sanskrit and Pali). How does it affect our understanding of holy books if the language one speaks determines how one thinks? Could that lead to misunderstandings?
Another thing I thought about concerning the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis is how some social justice activists controversially promote certain language, such as gender neutrality. (Sometimes such language policies are controversial even among activists, such as “people-first” language, which means saying “people with disabilities”, rather than “disabled people”.) One example of this is use of pronouns, how some activists give their preferred pronouns as a way of supporting the inclusion and equality of trans and non-binary people. (One controversial example of this is the singular they.) Another example is expressing opposition to certain terms that are considered demeaning. Sometimes this is controversial because these change, and terms commonly used in one era become taboo in another. These activists are sometimes criticized with claims that focusing on language only focuses on the outside and encourages folks to be fake, and that, even when using PC language, folks will remain bigoted AF. These activists defend their approach by claiming that changing he language will change attitudes.
Are these activists partly influenced by the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis?
However, at the end of this section, Salzmann notes that there are critiques of the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis (p. 55). I am going to discuss some I can see. The first is correlation =/= cause; with Hopi, there could be other causes of the differences between Hopi and Standard Average European cultures besides language. We can also note differences among speakers of the same language.
To refer to the aforementioned social justice activists and their language campaigns, it would be interesting to see comparisons among languages. Advocates of people first language claim that it is demeaning to say “disabled” before “person” and that such a phrase puts the disabled above the person. However, in some languages, nouns come before adjectives, and in some cultures, what comes last is most important. it would be interesting to do comparisons across cultures to see how attitudes differ, compared to with the placement of most important items and whether or syntax.
I mentioned pronouns earlier. Some languages lack gendered pronouns. It would be interesting to do a comparison across cultures for correlations between inclusivity and how gendered the language’s pronoun system is.
Detective Spencer looked at the collapsed tent, taking notes. There had been a string of vandalisms the past night: broken windows, graffiti, etc. He sat in the car, reviewing his notes. Suddenly, his partner, Agent Blane, showed him some tweets:
“Make them pay! #Revolution!”
“We shall rise!”
Agent Blane explained, “It seems that these attacks were tied to…”
Agent Blane’s phone rang. She answered, and, after the call, said, “We need to go!” She turned on the car, turned on the siren, and floored the accelerator.
Their car was going down the street when, suddenly, BOOM!
This is a post for Friday Fictioneers by Rochelle Wisoff-Fields; photo by Jan Wayne Fields.
This post is a paper I did in literature class back in spring 2018, and I’m sharing it for the world:
There are a number of themes in Hughes’s poems and other writings, such as the contrast between the ideal and the real, racial cruelty, and weariness and resignation (Roberts & Zweig, p. 852), and these often intersect. I will illustrate examples of these themes, and how they intersect in Langston Hughes’s works.
The ideal versus the real is illustrated in the poem “Let America Be America Again” (pp. 857-858). The ideal is expressed in the popular narrative of how America is a land of freedom, without tyrants, and of opportunity, and in the immigrants’ dreams. The real is expressed in the refrain of how this was never true for the speaker. He expresses that, in fact, workers are exploited, Native Americans were driven from their lands, and black people were enslaved. He uses the words, “I am the man who never got ahead/The poorest worker bartered through the years” (p. 858).
The poem “Will V-Day Day Be Me-Day Too?” illustrates how racial cruelty intersects with all three themes mentioned above. We see racial cruelty mentioned when the speaker asks whether or not he’ll have to face Jim Crow and lynching upon return from WWII (poets.org). This also shows the contrast between the ideal and the real, as FDR had said that the war was to “make the world safe for democracy”, and he mentions the liberation of various foreign peoples. However, he observes that African-Americans face oppression in USA. However, there is no resignation in the poem, in that the speaker asks whether or not things will change. In sum, the speaker observes that the reality of racial cruelty falls short of the ideals of liberty and democracy. However, he refuses to resign in despair, and instead asks whether or not the freedom for which he fought for other peoples will be granted to him.
The poem “Negro” depicts racial cruelty, in depicting how black people have been slaves for centuries, from antiquity to contemporary times. Specifically, he mentions the mutilation of the Congolese by the Belgians (when Congo was the private colony of King Leopold II) and lynching in Mississippi (Roberts & Zweig, p. 859).
The work (which is not a poem) “Negroes in Spain” also shows the intersection of racial cruelty and resignation. The work is about black people and Moors fighting in the Spanish Civil War, which occurred from 1936-1939. The author talks of how Franco uses Moors to fight for fascism, which is white supremacist. However, there is a rejection of resignation, in that the writer expresses the hope that the Moors will reject Franco (Modern American Poetry).
Racial cruelty is also depicted in the poem “Remember” (poetryfoundation.org). In this poem, the speaker urges black people, wherever they are, to look at white people, who have all the power and exploited them, and made villains out of black people. This is a concise way to sum up all the cruelty faced by black people in American society.
All three themes are shown in the poem “I look at the world” (poetryfoundation.org). The speaker, representative of any African-American, mentions being assigned to “a fenced-off narrow space”, which references Jim Crow and the disadvantages faced by black people in American society. While this may sound like a minor nuisance, these norms were enforced with the threat of lynching, and this implies cruelty. This is the real. Here the speaker does not give into resignation, but not only dreams of a better world, but states a readiness to work for it, as is stated in the poem, “I can see what my own hands can make/The world that’s in my mind./ Let’s hurry, comrades,/The road to find.” This is the ideal. The real is racism, and the ideal is equality. However, the speaker does not give into despair, but optimistically urges others to join him or her in the fight.
According to the Poetry Foundation (poetryfoundation.org), Hughes’s father was disillusioned with American racism and moved to Mexico, where he became very critical of other African-Americans. The site suggests that this impacted the younger Hughes who decided to embrace African-American society. In addition, Hughes decided to write about ordinary black people, with whom he had grown up and whom he knows. A third aspect of Hughes mentioned by the Poetry Foundation is that Hughes never lost his belief that most people, regardless of race or nationality, are generally good, and his hope for a better world. Also, Hughes had lived in a number of states and countries.
We see this reflected in his writings. His depictions of racial cruelty reflect are tied to his experiences with ordinary African-Americans, for whom such cruelty would have been life. Hughes would have been exposed to a variety of challenges faced by African-Americans because he had lived in a number of states. His conclusion that most people are good would have allowed him to reject resignation, and instead dream of a better world. Because of this, his poems convey appeals to the ideals and calls for people to change the real to match the ideal. Furthermore, we see what actually is versus what should be. Often it is so-called Realists™ who point this out, and they dismiss idealists. However, this is not reflected in Hughes’s poems. There is none of that, “Oh, sure, that would be nice, but you got to live in the Real World™.” Instead, Hughes’s speakers not only committed to working to make the ideal real, but urged the readers to also work to make the ideal real.
In summary, Hughes’s poems show racial cruelty, which were likely inspired by that which those who knew Hughes faced, and even what Hughes himself faced. However, Hughes, who was widely traveled across the States and a number of countries, remained optimistic about humanity. Because of this, his poems also reject resignation and contain calls to make the ideal real.
Hughes, Langston. “Selected Poems”. Literature: An Introduction to Reading and Writing,
edited by Edgar V. Roberts and Robert Zweig. Pearson Education, Inc. 2015, pp. 849-862
“Negroes in Spain”, from The Volunteer for Liberty. Modern American Poetry.
http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/poets/g_l/hughes/inspain.htm. Accessed 11 April
Poetry Foundation. https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poets/langston-hughes. Accessed 11 April
https://www.poets.org/poetsorg/poet/langston-hughes. Accessed 11 April 2018
In this post, I will discuss the general accusation that the CRC is anti-family, and sum up the series, in addition to calling for ratification.
Most of the objections I have addressed can be summed up in a belief that the CRC is anti-family and/or undermines parental rights. Renteln (p. 636) and The Campaign for the U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child state that the CRC seeks to balance parental and children’s rights, and that article 5 mentions the right of parents, extended family, and other legal guardians to provide direction and guidance in line with the evolving capacities of the child. The previously mentioned Campaign also notes that the CRC Preamble states that the family is the fundamental unit of society and that “that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love, and understanding.” Similarly, Smolin (pp. 92-93) notes that children’s autonomy rights are limited, noting that child labor laws restrict a child’s “right” to earn an income (protection from child labor is in CRC article 32) and compulsory education restricts child’s autonomy (compulsory education is in CRC article 28). Thus, the treaty allows caregivers and guardians to provide reasonable restrictions, and urges that said caregivers help develop the child into a functioning adult. These provisions are to protect children from abuse and exploitation, and to help them function in a global world.
I mentioned earlier that USA is the only country to have not ratified the treaty. My concern is that this harms US credibility in the world. The American narrative is that USA is the bastion of human rights, and that is the message we tell the world. However, the fact USA has not ratified this treaty is potentially a blow to credibility, and leaves us with nothing to back our claims on when calling out other nations’ human rights violations. The treaty is important because it is so global, and had global input (UNICEF) Thus, appeal to the treaty will reduce the chances of cultural bias. For this reason, USA should ratify this treaty.
Campaign for the U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. “Questions and Answers about the CRC”, https://web.archive.org/web/20130823172934/http://childrightscampaign.org/the-facts/questions-a-answers-about-the-crc
Renteln, Alison D. (1997). “WHO’S AFRAID OF THE CRC: OBJECTIONS TO THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD”, ILSA Journal of Int’l & Comparative Law, Vol. 3:629
Smolin, David M. (2006). “Overcoming Religious Objections to the Convvention on the Rights of the Child”, Emory International Law Review, Vol. 20
In my last post, I discussed spanking and abortion as they relate to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In this post, I will discuss freedom of religion, information, and association. One objection is that kids will be able to refuse to go to their parents’ religious services or to join cults. (That is a curious combination, as cults tend to force kids to stay in the cult.) The Campaign for the U.S. Ratification on the Rights of the Child says that this provision just means children have religious freedom without government interference, and observes that even highly religious States such as Vatican City have ratified the treaty. I will also note that the Convention repeatedly calls for policies to be carried out that reflect “the best interests” of the child, and article 5 states that parents, extended family, and other guardians are to provide guidance in that role. (I will discuss this article more later on when addressing the Convention’s alleged anti-family bias.)
The “best interests” phrase also addresses concerns that freedoms of association and information will allow kids to join gangs, racist groups, or access pornography. The Campaign for the U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child states that freedom of association means the right to peaceably assemble, and does not refer to parents’ restricting their kids’ choices. Also, to address concerns that it would allow kids to join racist groups, the Convention specifically says rights are limited and do not include things contrary to the purpose of the treaty or that infringe on others’ rights. The Convention specifically says that the rights apply to children regardless of race (article 2), and that education shall promote tolerance across differing groups (article 29, to be discussed later). Thus, joining racist groups is contrary to the purposes of the Convention.
I will also address concerns on education in this post. Farris (p.3) expresses concern that Article 29 of the Convention would ban the teaching of Christianity in schools, and Klichka and Estrada fear that Christian schools will be threatened by said article. The concern comes from a provision in article 29 that education be directed to “The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin”. Evangelical Christians tend to believe that one must accept Jesus to be saved, and see any contradiction as an attack on their faith. Thus, this provision is feared.
However, Smolin (p. 104) observes that this article doesn’t need religious relativism, and that such a relativism is self-defeating, as it would say that most religions are wrong. While many find exclusivist claims in conservative forms of Christianity and Islam distasteful, Eliza Griswold, in her book The Tenth Parallel, observes how a Christian pastor and Muslim imam in Northern Nigeria (both men are Fundamentalists) cooperate for the good of the village. This shows that teaching one’s religion as the right one is not mutually exclusive with article 29. Besides, Holland and Belgium have ratified the treaty, and both fund private as well as public schools.
Campaign for the U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. “CRC: Facts and Myths”, https://web.archive.org/web/20110408160613/http://childrightscampaign.org/crcindex.php?sNav=getinformed_snav.php&sDat=faqs_dat.php
Farris, Michael. (2009). “Nannies in Blue Berets:
Understanding the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child”, available here
Griswold, Eliza. (2010) The Tenth Parallel, Farrar, Straus and Giroux
Klichka, Christopher, J and Estrada, William A. (2007). “The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child: The Most Dangerous Attack on Parents’ Rights
In the History of the United States”, https://web.archive.org/web/20080326173650/http://hslda.org/docs/nche/000000/00000020.asp
Smolin, David M. (2006). “Overcoming Religious Objections to the Convvention on the Rights of the Child”, Emory International Law Review, Vol. 20
Many objections to the CRC center on parental rights, and claim that these are undermined by the UN. Some areas included in this objection involve spanking, abortion, religious freedom, freedom of information, and freedom of association. In this post, I will address these objections.
The treaty does not specifically address spanking. However, provisions in articles 19 and 28 are cited as possibly anti-spanking. Article 28 says that school discipline shall be applied in a way consistent with the child’s dignity and with the Convention, and article 19 mentions protecting kids from physical and mental violence. Furthermore, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has recommended that countries not spank.
However, while virtually all nations have ratified the Convention, most have not banned spanking. Michael Farris expresses concern that the treaty would result in legal sanctions against parents who spanked (p. 6). However, this is not the necessary outcome, as Sweden has long banned spanking, and spankers are given suggestions to resources to learn better ways (Gumbrecht). While the Committee opposes corporal punishment, its views do not form international law (Smolin, p. 103). Smolin notes that USA can ratify a treaty with the understanding that Article 19 does not ban spanking. Thus, ratification of the treaty will not mean that spanking is banned.
In this post, I will also discuss abortion briefly. Michael Farris (p. 27) from the Homeschool Legal Defense Association (HSLDA) claims that the Convention would allow minors to get abortions without parental approval, and quotes pro-choice recommendations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child as support for his claims. In addition, the reference to family planning in article 24 and to the right to privacy in article 16 are seen as supporting a minor’s right to an abortion without parental consent. However, Renteln (pp. 633-634) observes that some provisions can be seen as in opposition to abortion, considering article 1 defines a child as someone under 18, but gives no lower limit; says in the preamble that children are entitled to care both before and after birth; and article 6 says that a child has a right to life. Furthermore, many countries with strong anti-abortion laws have ratified the treaty. Thus, the treaty leaves it up to each country to determine abortion policy.
In a later post, I will discuss freedom of religion, association, and information.
Farris, Michael. (2009). “Nannies in Blue Berets:
Understanding the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child”, pdf available here.
Gumbrecht, Jaime. (2011). “In Sweden, a generation of kids who’ve never been spanked”, https://www.cnn.com/2011/11/09/world/sweden-punishment-ban/index.html
Renteln, Alison D. (1997). “WHO’S AFRAID OF THE CRC: OBJECTIONS TOTHE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD”, ILSA Journal of Int’l & Comparative Law, Vol. 3:629
Smolin, David M. (2006). “Overcoming Religious Objections to the Convvention on the Rights of the Child”, Emory International Law Review, Vol. 20